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Abstract
We investigate the implications of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for interstate
conict. We set up a two-stage game with three competing importers, where rst, two
of the countries decide on whether to initiate war against each other, and subsequently,
all three countries select their import tari¤s. We show that PTAs produce both a
peace-creationand a peace-diversion e¤ect, whereby they reduce the likelihood of
conict between member countries (peace creation), but could render the eruption of
war between member and non-member countries more likely (peace diversion). This
paper is the rst to identify and explicitly model the peace-diversion e¤ect of PTAs, and
is also the only one in this literature to endogenize countriesterms of trade. We use
data from the Correlates of War project to empirically test these predictions, and after
controlling for endogeneity, we nd robust evidence of both peace creation and peace
diversion in relation to free-trade-area as well as customs-union establishment.
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1 Introduction
It is widely believed among historians and political scientists that the most important reason
for establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 the original pre-
decessor of the European Union (EU) was the desire to avoid another devastating major war
in Europe. In the words of the Schuman Declaration, which was presented by French foreign
minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 and proposed the creation of the ECSC, the pooling
of coal and steel production would make any war between age-old rivals France and Germany
not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.1 The pacifying role of the EU and its
forerunners was recognized by the Norwegian Nobel Committee in 2012, which awarded to
the EU the Nobel Peace Prize. In its o¢ cial announcement, the committee stated, The
stabilizing part played by the EU has helped to transform most of Europe from a continent
of war to a continent of peace.2
In this paper, we investigate both theoretically and empirically the implications of pref-
erential trade agreements (PTAs) for interstate conict. In particular, we explore whether,
in line with the EU case, PTAs reduce the likelihood of conict between member countries.
At the same time, since PTAs have important ramications for the bilateral trade relation-
ship between member and non-member countries, we also analyze the impact of PTAs on the
likelihood of war between PTA members and non-member states.
On the theoretical side, we develop a three-country competing-importers model, where two
of the countries are enemies,as they contest part of each others resources. The countries
engage in a two-stage game, in the rst stage of which, the two enemies decide on whether
to wage war against each other. In the second stage, all three countries select their import
tari¤s. Countries at war do not trade with each other and, additionally, bear a xed cost of
destruction. Moreover, in the event of war, the victor seizes its adversarys contested resources,
with the probability of prevailing in an armed conict being a function of the relative military
expenditures of the enemy countries. We solve this dynamic game under the scenario of
no regionalism, which is our benchmark scenario, and under four di¤erent PTA scenarios,
1See http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/
index_en.htm.
2See http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2012/announce-2012/.
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involving a free-trade-area (FTA) or a customs-union (CU) agreement either between the two
enemies or between one of the enemies and the third country.
In the absence of regionalism, we nd that war takes place if and only if the military
expenditures of the two enemies are su¢ ciently asymmetric. Furthermore, a PTA between
the enemy countries, in the form of either an FTA or a CU agreement, renders, in general, the
eruption of war less likely, in the sense that an even larger asymmetry in military spending
between the two enemies is then required for war to break out in equilibrium. This stems
from the fact that a PTA between the enemies increases their welfare under peace (and thus,
the opportunity cost of war) via (i) eliminating the ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers between
them; and (ii) improving their terms of trade vis-à-vis the third country due to the PTAs
tari¤-complementarity e¤ect in the case of an FTA agreement, or as a result of both its
market-power and tari¤-complementarity e¤ects in the case of a CU agreement. Hence, at a
more general level, our results establish that PTAs exert a peace-creation e¤ect on their
member countries, which is in line with the EU experience.
However, our analysis illustrates that PTAs could also be detrimental to peace. More
specically, in the case of a CU agreement between one of the adversaries and the third
country, the former is less likely to start a war in comparison with our benchmark scenario,
since the CU raises, via its terms-of-trade ramications, the countrys welfare under peace
relative to its expected welfare under war. Nevertheless, the opposite holds for the other
adversary that is not part of the CU, as that country faces instead a decrease in its welfare
under peace relative to its expected welfare under war. Therefore, the overall e¤ect of the
CU in question on the likelihood that the enemy countries go to war is ambiguous. On the
other hand, our ndings demonstrate that an FTA agreement between one of the enemy
countries and the third country renders, unambiguously, the eruption of war more likely,
as both enemies are then more likely to initiate war against each other. More generally, our
results show that CU agreements produce a peace-diversione¤ect on non-member countries,
while FTA agreements exert such an e¤ect on member as well as on non-member countries.
At a broad level, the peace-creation and peace-diversion e¤ects of PTAs that emerge from our
analysis are somewhat reminiscent of their trade-creation and trade-diversion e¤ects originally
identied by Viner (1950).
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We use data on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) from the Correlates of War (COW)
project to empirically test these predictions. Our sample consists of 260,781 annual country-
pair (dyadic) observations over the period 19582000. To enhance comparability with the
existing literature, the empirical strategy adopted is based on Martin et al. (2008) and Vicard
(2012). We address the possible endogeneity bias related to membership of FTAs and CUs
by (i) controlling for a large number of potential common determinants of both regionalism
and interstate conict; (ii) taking advantage of the panel dimension of our data set and
controlling for country-pair xed e¤ects; and nally, (iii) employing an instrumental-variables
(IV) strategy. Our empirical results provide robust evidence of both peace creation and peace
diversion in relation to FTA as well as CU establishment.
Few papers look at the interplay between regionalism and interstate conict. In particular,
Manseld et al. (1999) and Manseld and Pevehouse (2000), using data on MIDs over the
period 19501985, nd that PTAs produce a peace-creation e¤ect on their member countries.
In another, more recent, empirical study, Vicard (2012) provides evidence that deep PTAs,
such as CUs and common markets, reduce the probability of conict between member coun-
tries, but shallow PTAs, such as FTAs and partial scope agreements, have no such e¤ect.
On the other hand, Martin et al. (2012) look at the reverse question, and nd that country
pairs with a higher frequency of old wars are more likely to sign PTAs, whereas a higher
frequency of recent wars has the exact opposite e¤ect. Finally, Schi¤ and Winters (1998)
develop a theoretical model in which they assume that trade reduces frictions between hostile
neighboring countries, and explore whether a PTA can generate welfare gains for its members
under those conditions and how such a PTA would evolve over time. We di¤er from these
papers in two important ways. First, this is the rst paper to identify and explicitly model the
peace-diversion e¤ect of PTAs. Second, this is the only paper in this literature to endogenize
countriesterms of trade, proposing a novel mechanism through which regionalism can a¤ect
interstate conict.
Our paper is also naturally related to the literature on the impact of international trade
on interstate conict. More particularly, a voluminous body of research has empirically inves-
tigated the long-standing liberal peace hypothesisthat trade promotes peace. Many studies
nd a negative relationship between bilateral trade and bilateral conict, lending support to
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the liberal peace hypothesis (see, for example, Polachek, 1980; Oneal and Russett, 1999). A
number of papers, though, either nd no evidence of the pacifying e¤ect of economic interde-
pendence (see, for instance, Kim and Rousseau, 2005) or even nd that trade increases conict
(see, for example, Barbieri, 1996), which are in line with the theories of the neo-Marxist and
realist/neo-realist schools of thought in political science. On the theory side, Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (2001) and Garnkel et al. (2009, 2012) develop models of trade with an insecure
resource, and compare the e¤ects of autarky and free trade on the intensity of competition
between countries (through arming) over the contested resource as well as on their welfare. In
their analyses, the world relative price of the contested resource emerges as the pivotal factor.
Last, Martin et al. (2008) investigate both theoretically and empirically the ramications of
trade for war, and nd that bilateral trade openness deters bilateral war, while multilateral
trade openness increases the probability of war between any given pair of countries. None
of these papers, however, shares our focus on regionalism and its implications for interstate
conict via its terms-of-trade e¤ects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the basics.
Section 3 solves our dynamic game under our benchmark scenario of no regionalism. Sections
4 and 5 explore, theoretically, the impact of FTA and CU agreements on interstate conict.
Section 6 provides empirical evidence in support of our theoretical predictions. Finally, Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume the world consists of three countries, A, B, and C, that trade three goods, a, b,
and c, with trade being subject to the imposition of specic (non-prohibitive) import tari¤s.
Country J is endowed with three units of good j that are uniformly distributed over its
territory, and zero units of the other two goods, where J 2 fA;B;Cg and j 2 fa; b; cg. On the
consumption side, we maintain the assumptions that demand functions are symmetric across
countries and goods, and that the demand for any given good in any country is independent
of the other two goodsprices. More specically, the demand for good i 2 fa; b; cg in country
J is of the linear form C
 
P Ji

=   P Ji , where  > 3,  > 0 are constants and P Ji is good
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is price in country J . Given our setup, country J exports good j to the other two countries,
that is, we have a competing-importers framework.
Countries A and B are enemies,as they contest a fraction  < 1 of each others territory.
This territorial dispute between countries A and B induces them to engage in the production
of guns, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be a non-consumption, non-tradable good.
Arming has two o¤setting welfare e¤ects. On the one hand, gun production consumes a
countrys endowment, or resources, in a uniform manner across its territory. On the other
hand, a countrys allocation of resources to arming enhances its chances of prevailing in a
military conict, should such a conict arise. More specically, should countries A and B go
to war, country A prevails with probability gA=
 
gA + gB

and, thereby, seizes the whole of
country Bs disputed territory while retaining its own contested territory, where gA, gB < 1
denote the fraction of their endowment that countries A and B, respectively, devote to gun
production. Therefore, in the event of victory, country A appropriates 3
 
1  gB units
of good b, with 3
 
1  gB being country Bs post-arming, pre-war endowment of good b.
Symmetrically analogous relationships hold for country B. War, however, entails substantial
costs for the participant countries even in the event of victory. In particular, should countries
A and B engage in military conict, they lose, respectively, KA units of good a and KB units
of good b (on top of each losing its contested territory to the other if defeated), where KA,
KB are a priori known to both countries. KA, KB can be thought of as the xed cost of
destruction born by countries A and B as a result of the military dispute. In addition, in the
event of war, bilateral trade between countries A and B is totally disrupted.
To keep our analysis as straightforward as possible, we introduce two simplifying assump-
tions. First, any endowment a country seizes through war can only be used for domestic
consumption, that is, it cannot be exported. Second, there is no territorial dispute between
country C and either country A or country B; thus, country C devotes no resources to the
production of guns (that is, gC = 0).
The timing of actions undertaken by the three countries is as follows:
 Stage 1: Countries A and B decide simultaneously on whether to wage war against each
other, taking gA and gB as given. In the event of war, they experience the aforementioned
changes in their endowments and bilateral trade relationship.
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 Stage 2: All three countries simultaneously pick their import tari¤s.
To explore the ramications of trade and regionalism for interstate conict, we solve this two-
stage game under ve di¤erent scenarios: (i) no regionalism, which is our benchmark scenario;
(ii) an FTA agreement between countries A and B; (iii) an FTA agreement between countries
A and C; (iv) a CU agreement between countries A and B; and (v) a CU agreement between
countries A and C. For each scenario, we solve the game backwards in order to identify its
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
3 Conict in the Absence of a PTA
We start by solving our two-stage game under the benchmark scenario, that is, under no
regionalism. To this end, we rst look at stage 2 and derive the Nash equilibrium tari¤s as a
function of the stage-1 outcome. There exist three possible stage-1 outcomes to consider: (i)
peace; (ii) war between countries A and B, in which country A prevails; and (iii) war between
countries A and B, in which country B prevails.
Let us begin with peace. Letting  Jj denote the tari¤ of country  J on good j, the
no-arbitrage condition yields P Jj = P
J
j + 
 J
j , where J 2 fA;B;Cg,  J 2 fA;B;Cg n fJg,
and j 2 fa; b; cg. The equilibrium prices can then be obtained from the usual market-clearing
conditions: C
 
P Jj (
 ! j)

+
P
 J
C
 
P Jj (
 ! j)

= 3
 
1  gJ, where  ! j represents the vector of
tari¤s good j faces internationally.3
We dene the welfare of country J as the sum over each (consumption) good of consumer
surplus, producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue:
W J
nregpeace
=
Z 

PJj (
 ! j)
C (P ) dP +
X
 j
Z 

PJ j(
 !  j)
C (P ) dP
+
Z PJj ( ! j)
0
3
 
1  gJ dP +X
 j
J jM
J
 j (
 !  j) , (1)
where  j 2 fa; b; cgnfjg, andMJ j represents the imports into country J of good  j. Setting 
@W J
nregpeace
=@J j

= 0 and solving for J j, we obtain countriesbest-response tari¤s. For
3Recall here that gC = 0 throughout our analysis.
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instance, country As best-response tari¤ on good b equals:
A
R
b =
3(1  gB) + Cb
8
, (2)
with symmetrically analogous relationships holding for the rest of the countries and goods. As
equation (2) illustrates, there is strategic complementarity between countriestari¤ policies.
The intuition is straightforward. A higher tari¤, for example, on good b by country C implies,
ceteris paribus, more units of b being shipped to country A. Thus, a higher Cb raises the tari¤-
revenue gain for country A from marginally increasing Ab , inducing country A to impose a
higher tari¤ on good b. Finally, using the best-response tari¤ functions, the Nash equilibrium
tari¤s are readily derived:
J
nregpeace
 j =
3
 
1  g J
7
. (3)
Let us consider next the second possible stage-1 outcome: war between countries A and
B, in which country A prevails. As we discussed above, in such a case, country A seizes
the whole of country Bs disputed territory and, as a result, obtains 3
 
1  gB units of
good b, which can be used solely for domestic consumption. Moreover, due to the destruction
brought about by the military conict, country B loses (additionally) KB units of good b,
while country A loses KA units of good a. Finally, bilateral trade between countries A and B
ceases. Therefore, national welfare for countries A and B is now, respectively, given by:
WA
nregwinsA
=
Z 

PAa (
C
a )
C (P ) dP +
Z 

PAb
C (P ) dP +
Z 

PAc (
A
c ;
B
c )
C (P ) dP
+
Z PAa (Ca )
0

3
 
1  gA KA dP + Z PAb
0
3
 
1  gB dP + AcMAc  Ac ; Bc  and (4)
WB
nregwinsA
=
Z 

PBb (Cb )
C (P ) dP +
Z 

PBc (
A
c ;
B
c )
C (P ) dP
+
Z PBb (Cb )
0

3 (1  )  1  gB KB dP + Bc MBc  Ac ; Bc  . (5)
On the other hand, national welfare for C is still given by (1), as the war between A and B
does not a¤ect country Cs endowment, nor does it disrupt Cs bilateral trade with either of
the adversaries.
8
Straightforward calculations yield the following Nash equilibrium tari¤s:
A
nregwinsA
c =
3
7
= B
nregwinsA
c , (6)
C
nregwinsA
a =
3
 
1  gA KA
3
, and (7)
C
nregwinsA
b =
3 (1  )  1  gB KB
3
. (8)
The welfare ramications for the three countries of the third possible stage-1 outcome
war between countries A and B, in which country B prevails are symmetrically analogous
to the ones of the second possible stage-1 outcome war between countries A and B, in which
country A prevails which we have just analyzed. The Nash equilibrium tari¤s under the
scenario that country B has won the war against country A in stage 1, then, equal:
A
nregwinsB
c =
3
7
= B
nregwinsB
c , (9)
C
nregwinsB
a =
3 (1  )  1  gA KA
3
, and (10)
C
nregwinsB
b =
3
 
1  gB KB
3
. (11)
Last, we turn to stage 1, where countries A and B decide simultaneously on whether to
wage war against each other, taking gA and gB as given. To do so, they compare their welfare
under peace against their expected welfare under war. For example, country A compares
WA
nregpeace
against
 
gA=
 
gA + gB

WA
nregwinsA
+
 
gB=
 
gA + gB

WA
nregwinsB
. To solve the
rst stage of the game, we need to resort to numerical analysis.4 As Figure 1 illustrates, war
takes place if and only if countriesmilitary expenditures (that is, gA and gB) are su¢ ciently
asymmetric. Intuitively, war is optimal for a given country if (i) its probability of prevailing is
su¢ ciently high; and (ii) the endowment it will appropriate in the event of victory is su¢ ciently
large. If gA and gB are su¢ ciently asymmetric, both of the aforementioned conditions are
satised for the country with the relatively high military expenditures, which has thereby an
incentive to initiate war against the country with the relatively low level of arming.
4The numerical analysis was carried out using Mathematica. The le is available from the authors upon
request.
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4 Conict in the Presence of an FTA
We next examine the implications of an FTA agreement for interstate conict. Two scenarios
are considered: (i) an FTA agreement between countries A and B, that is, an FTA agreement
between the enemy countries; and (ii) an FTA agreement between countries A and C, that is,
an FTA agreement between one of the enemy countries and the third country. In the former
scenario, should countries A and B engage in military conict, their FTA breaks down and
there is no bilateral trade any longer between them.
4.1 An FTA between Countries A and B
We start by examining stage 2 and solving for the Nash equilibrium tari¤s as a function of
the stage-1 outcome. As before, we need to consider three possible stage-1 outcomes: (i)
peace; (ii) war between countries A and B, in which country A prevails; and (iii) war between
countries A and B, in which country B prevails. Let us start with peace. In such a case,
the FTA between countries A and B is preserved, meaning that Ab = 
B
a = 0. Otherwise,
the welfare for country J 2 fA;B;Cg is still given by (1). It is direct to show that the Nash
equilibrium tari¤s then equal:
A
ftaABpeace
c =
3
7
= B
ftaABpeace
c , (12)
C
ftaABpeace
a =
3
 
1  gA
8
, and (13)
C
ftaABpeace
b =
3
 
1  gB
8
. (14)
Two observations can be readily made. First, A
ftaABpeace
c = 
BftaABpeace
c = 
Anregpeace
c =
B
nregpeace
c = (3=7). Second, 
CftaABpeace
a < 
Cnregpeace
a and 
CftaABpeace
b < 
Cnregpeace
b , reecting
the tari¤-complementarity e¤ect of FTA formation.5 To gain some insight into these results,
note that the reduction to zero of the tari¤s of countries A and B on each other has a negative
impact on their exports to country C, lowering the tari¤-revenue gain for country C from
5The term tari¤ complementaritywas rst introduced by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). However, in their
competing-exporters model, the tari¤-complementarity e¤ect of PTAs works to reduce the tari¤s of member
countries vis-à-vis non-member countries. By contrast, in our competing-importers framework, it works to
lower the tari¤s of non-member countries vis-à-vis member countries.
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marginally raising Ca or 
C
b . Therefore, the removal of all trade barriers between A and B
induces C to reduce its import tari¤s on goods a and b. On the other hand, because of our
assumption that the demand for any given good in any country does not depend on the other
two goodsprices, the optimal tari¤ choices of countries A and B vis-à-vis country C are
una¤ected by their FTA agreement.
Under the other two possible stage-1 outcomes war between countries A and B, in which
either country A or country B prevails the FTA breaks down and bilateral trade between
A and B ceases. Thus, under the two di¤erent stage-1 war outcomes, the stage-2 subgames
(and their tari¤ equilibria) are identical with the corresponding benchmark ones.
Finally, let us consider stage 1. To solve the rst stage of the game, numerical analysis is
required anew. As Figure 2 demonstrates, for su¢ ciently small gB, the likelihood of country
A waging war against country B decreases as a result of their FTA agreement, meaning that
for such values of gB, the FTA between countries A and B has a peace-creatione¤ect on
country A. Intuitively, the FTA agreement between countries A and B has no e¤ect on As
expected welfare under war, whereas it does raise, for su¢ ciently small gB, As welfare under
peace via (i) its tari¤-complementarity e¤ect, which acts to improve As terms of trade vis-à-
vis country C; and (ii) totally eliminating the ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers between A and
B.
However, as Figure 2 illustrates, for extremevalues of gB, the likelihood of A initiating
war against B increases as a result of their FTA agreement. The intuition is slightly more
involved in this case. In particular, as we argued above, the FTA between countries A and B
leaves As expected welfare under war una¤ected. On the other hand, under peace, the FTA in
question has (i) a positive e¤ect on PAa , reducing consumer surplus in country A; but also (ii)
a negative e¤ect on PAb , raising the surplus of consumers in country A. For extreme values of
gB, country Bs post-arming endowment of good b that is available for consumption globally
is small,substantially weakening the relative strength of the latter consumer-surplus e¤ect.
In fact, it turns out that for such values of gB, the FTA agreement between A and B leads,
under peace, to a decrease in As overall welfare mainly via inicting on it a consumer-surplus
loss. In any case, as this scenario arises only for unrealistically high values of gB, we choose
to ignore it in our subsequent analysis.
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Parallel results hold for country B. Hence, for the (empirically) relevant range of gA and
gB, an FTA agreement between the enemy countries has a peace-creation e¤ect on both of
them, rendering the eruption of war less likely.
4.2 An FTA between Countries A and C
We now examine the impact of an FTA agreement between countries A and C on the likelihood
that the enemy countries go to war. Given the FTA between A and C, we have, by denition,
that Ac = 
C
a = 0. In order to derive the stage-2 Nash equilibrium tari¤s, suppose rst that
the stage-1 outcome is peace. It can be readily shown that under this scenario, the Nash
equilibrium tari¤s equal:
A
ftaACpeace
b =
3
 
1  gB
7
= C
ftaACpeace
b , (15)
B
ftaACpeace
a =
3
 
1  gA
8
, and (16)
B
ftaACpeace
c =
3
8
. (17)
Suppose next that war breaks out in stage 1, in which country A prevails. Straightforward
calculations yield the following Nash tari¤s:
B
ftaACwinsA
c =
3
8
and (18)
C
ftaACwinsA
b =
3 (1  )  1  gB KB
3
. (19)
Alternatively, if country B wins the war, the tari¤s that emerge in Nash equilibrium equal:
B
ftaACwinsB
c =
3
8
and (20)
C
ftaACwinsB
b =
3
 
1  gB KB
3
. (21)
Note that B
ftaACpeace
a , 
B
ftaACpeace
c , 
BftaACwinsA
c , and 
BftaACwinsB
c are strictly lower than, re-
spectively, B
nregpeace
a , 
B
nregpeace
c , 
B
nregwinsA
c , and 
B
nregwinsB
c , which stems from the tari¤-
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complementarity e¤ect of FTA formation.
Finally, we turn to stage 1. The results from our numerical analysis are depicted in Figure
2. As the gure illustrates, country A is more likely to initiate war against country B as a
result of its FTA agreement with country C. Intuitively, there are two o¤setting forces at
work here. In particular, the FTA agreement between countries A and C increases As welfare
under peace via (i) eliminating the ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers between A and C; and (ii)
its tari¤-complementarity e¤ect, which works to improve As terms of trade vis-à-vis country
B. However, through the former channel, the FTA in question also raises As expected welfare
under war. Our numerical analysis does reveal that the pro-war force (that is, the latter one)
dominates. To gain some insight into this, recall that under war, country A only trades with
country C; thus, the removal of all trade barriers between A and C has a signicantly larger
(positive) welfare impact on A under war than under peace.
At the same time, as Figure 2 demonstrates, country B is more likely as well to wage
war against country A as a result of the FTA agreement between A and C. The intuition
underlying this nding is straightforward. Once again, there are two conicting forces at play.
On the one hand, the FTA between A and C lowers Bs welfare under peace via its tari¤-
complementarity e¤ect, which acts to worsen Bs terms of trade vis-à-vis both FTA partners.
On the other hand, via inducing the deterioration of Bs terms of trade vis-à-vis country C,
the FTA in question also decreases Bs expected welfare under war. Clearly, the pro-war
force (that is, the former one) is relatively stronger and hence, the FTA between countries
A and C increases the likelihood of country B initiating war against its enemy. To sum up,
an FTA agreement between one of the enemy countries and the third country produces a
peace-diversione¤ect on both adversaries, rendering the eruption of war more likely.
5 Conict in the Presence of a CU
We nally examine the ramications of a CU agreement for interstate conict. In the same
spirit as above, we consider two alternative scenarios: (i) a CU agreement between countries
A and B, that is, a CU agreement between the enemy countries; and (ii) a CU agreement
between countries A and C, that is, a CU agreement between one of the enemy countries and
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the third country. Note that in the former scenario, the CU between the enemy countries only
survives under peace.
5.1 A CU between Countries A and B
Suppose rst that the stage-1 outcome is peace. In such a case, the CU between the enemy
countries is preserved, meaning that Ab = 
B
a = 0 and that countries A and B have a
common external tari¤ vis-à-vis country C. Straightforward calculations reveal that in Nash
equilibrium:
A
cuABpeace
c = 
BcuABpeace
c =
6
5
, (22)
C
cuABpeace
a =
3
 
1  gA
8
, and (23)
C
cuABpeace
b =
3
 
1  gB
8
. (24)
Observe that A
cuABpeace
c = 
BcuABpeace
c > 
Anregpeace
c = 
Bnregpeace
c , which is due to the market-
power e¤ect of CU formation. In particular, as the CUmembers harmonize their external tari¤
policies, the CU enjoys more market power (that is, a greater ability to a¤ect world prices) than
either of its members taken individually. This naturally results in countries A and B jointly
implementing more restrictive import policies as compared with their unilateral policies in
the absence of the CU. By contrast, C
cuABpeace
a < 
Cnregpeace
a as well as 
CcuABpeace
b < 
Cnregpeace
b ,
reecting the tari¤-complementarity e¤ect of CU formation.
If instead war breaks out in stage 1 in which either country A or country B prevails the
CU, then, breaks down and bilateral trade between A and B is totally disrupted. Therefore,
under the two di¤erent stage-1 war outcomes, the stage-2 subgames (and their tari¤equilibria)
are exactly the same as the corresponding benchmark ones.
Last, we look at stage 1. Figure 3 depicts the ndings that emerge from our numerical
analysis. As the gure shows, the likelihood that countries A and B wage war against each
other decreases as a result of their CU agreement, that is, the CU agreement between A and B
produces a peace-creation e¤ect on both of the enemy countries. Intuitively, the CU between
A and B has no e¤ect on their expected welfare under war, but it does raise their welfare
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under peace via (i) eliminating their ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers against each other; and
(ii) its market-power and tari¤-complementarity e¤ects, which work to improve As and Bs
terms of trade vis-à-vis country C.
5.2 A CU between Countries A and C
We nally investigate the implications of a CU agreement between countries A and C for
military conict between the enemy countries. Given the CU between countries A and C, we
have, by denition, that Ac = 
C
a = 0 and that countries A and C impose a common tari¤ on
non-member country B (if they both trade with B). Under the scenario of peace in stage 1,
the following tari¤s arise in Nash equilibrium:
A
cuACpeace
b =
6
 
1  gB
5
= C
cuACpeace
b , (25)
B
cuACpeace
a =
3
 
1  gA
8
, and (26)
B
cuACpeace
c =
3
8
. (27)
Consider next the second possible stage-1 outcome: war between countries A and B, in
which country A prevails. It is straightforward to show that the Nash equilibrium tari¤s,
then, equal:
B
cuACwinsA
c =
3
8
and (28)
C
cuACwinsA
b =
3 (1  )  1  gB KB
3
. (29)
If instead country B prevails in the war, the following tari¤s emerge in Nash equilibrium:
B
cuACwinsB
c =
3
8
and (30)
C
cuACwinsB
b =
3
 
1  gB KB
3
. (31)
Observe here that (i) A
cuACpeace
b = 
CcuACpeace
b > 
Anregpeace
b = 
Cnregpeace
b , reecting the market-
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power e¤ect of CU establishment; and (ii) B
cuACpeace
a , 
BcuACpeace
c , 
BcuACwinsA
c , and 
BcuACwinsB
c
are strictly lower than, respectively, B
nregpeace
a , 
B
nregpeace
c , 
B
nregwinsA
c , and 
B
nregwinsB
c , which
stems from the tari¤-complementarity e¤ect of CU formation.
Last, let us turn to stage 1. The results from our numerical analysis are illustrated in
Figure 3. As the gure demonstrates, country A is less likely to initiate war against country
B as a result of its CU agreement with country C. The intuition underlying this nding is
direct. Two conicting forces are at work here. On the one hand, the CU between A and C
raises As welfare under peace via (i) totally eliminating the ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers
between A and C; and (ii) its market-power and tari¤-complementarity e¤ects, which act
to improve As terms of trade vis-à-vis country B. On the other hand, through the former
channel, the CU in question also increases As expected welfare under war. Clearly, the pro-
peace force (that is, the former one) is relatively stronger and thereby, the CU between A and
C decreases the likelihood of country A waging war against its enemy.
However, country B is more likely to start a war against country A as a result of the CU
agreement between A and C, meaning that the overall e¤ect of the CU on the likelihood that
the enemy countries go to war is ambiguous. Intuitively, there are once again two o¤setting
forces at play. In particular, the CU between A and C lowers Bs welfare under peace via
its market-power and tari¤-complementarity e¤ects, which work to worsen Bs terms of trade
vis-à-vis both CU partners. At the same time, via inducing the deterioration of Bs terms
of trade vis-à-vis country C, the CU in question also has a negative impact on Bs expected
welfare under war, but clearly, the pro-war force (that is, the former one) dominates. In
other words, a CU agreement between one of the adversaries and the third country produces
a peace-diversion e¤ect on the other adversary that is left out of the agreement.
6 Empirical Evidence
This section investigates empirically whether the peace-creation and peace-diversion e¤ects
of PTAs predicted by our theoretical model are in line with the historical data on interstate
conicts, international trade, and regionalism.
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6.1 Data and Main Variables
The principal source of the data used in this paper is the COW project, which makes available
a wide range of data sets related to armed conicts and international relations over the last
two centuries. Our dependent variable, MIDijt, is the occurrence of an MID between two
countries, and comes from the COW MID data set, version 3.02, that spans the period 1816
2001. Our analysis, however, uses only the years 19582000, primarily due to data restrictions
regarding our main explanatory variables related to regionalism. To obtain robust estimates
of war determinants, we follow the empirical literature on military conicts and use a broad
denition of war. In particular, we dene MIDijt to be equal to 1 (and 0 otherwise) when
an MID occurs at date t between countries i and j involving the display of force, the use of
force, or actual warfare, that is, when an MID of hostility level 3, 4, or 5, respectively, in the
COW coding system takes place. In our robustness analysis, we experiment with a stricter
denition of war by classifying as such only MIDs with a hostility level of (i) either 4 or 5; or
(ii) solely 5.6
The key explanatory variables, capturing regionalism, are created using information avail-
able in de Sousa (2012). In particular, for each country pair at date t, an FTA as well as a CU
dummy are constructed, FTAijt and CUijt, in order to investigate the impact of PTAs on the
probability of conict between member countries (that is, so as to assess their peace-creation
e¤ect). We also create two additional PTA-related variables, PTFTAijt and PTCUijt, in order
to explore the impact of PTAs on the probability of conict between member and non-member
countries (that is, so as to assess their peace-diversion e¤ect). The variables PTFTAijt and
PTCUijt reect the percentage of trade of the country pair (i, j) at date t with the rest of
the world (ROW) that is covered by FTA and CU agreements, respectively. More specically,
PTFTAijt is computed as follows:
PTFTAijt =
FTA trade of i with ROW at t+ FTA trade of j with ROW at t
Total trade of i with ROW at t+ Total trade of j with ROW at t
, (32)
where the ROW is all countries except i and j, and the trade data comes from the COW
6For more information on this data, see Jones et al. (1996), Faten et al. (2004), and the COW website
(http://www.correlatesofwar.org/).
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Bilateral Trade data set, version 2.01.7 It is important to stress that the numerator does not
include the bilateral trade of countries i and j with third countries that have simultaneously
FTA agreements with both of the former. This is done so that our econometric analysis follows
closely our theoretical model. Of course, we adjust the denominator of (32) accordingly.
PTCUijt is computed in an analogous way.
Moreover, to enhance comparability with the existing literature, we exploit the data set
assembled byMartin et al. (2008), which includes a long list of potential common determinants
of both regionalism and conict.8 These variables can be broadly divided into two sets: gravity
(or trade) variables and political ones. The former set includes variables such as bilateral
weighted distance, or dummies controlling for contiguity, colonial links, and the sharing of a
common language between countries i and j. The latter set includes variables controlling for
the size of the two countries, their political regime, and the diplomatic a¢ nity between them.
Our sample contains 260,781 annual country-pair (dyadic) observations over the period
19582000. Out of these, only 1,321 (that is, 0.51%) are engaged in military conict according
to our denition. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our
regressions. As is evident from the table, when the sample is restricted in our preferred regres-
sion specication (column 4 of Table 2) due to data availability, the overall MID frequency as
well as the descriptive statistics for the PTA-related variables all remain similar.
6.2 Empirical Strategy
The occurrence of an MID between two countries, i and j, at time t is a binary event, and
its probability is estimated using a logit model. The empirical specication adopted follows
largely the literature and is given by:
Pr fMIDijt = 1g = 
 
0 + 1FTAijt + 2CUijt + 3PTFTAijt + 4PTCUijt + Zijt

,
(33)
where the dependent variableMIDijt and the PTA-related explanatory variables FTAijt,
CUijt, PTFTAijt, PTCUijt are as dened above, Zijt is a vector of gravity and political
7For more information on the trade data, see Barbieri et al. (2008, 2009).
8The data is available on Mayers webpage (http://econ.sciences-po.fr/thierry-mayer).
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controls, and  () is the logistic cumulative distribution function. This empirical specication
enables us to test the main predictions derived from our theoretical model, which can be stated
in terms of equation (33) as follows:
Testable Prediction 1: The existence of an FTA or a CU between countries i and j
decreases the probability of conict between them (peace creation). We therefore expect that
1, 2 < 0.
Testable Prediction 2: The higher the percentage of trade of the country pair (i, j) with
the ROW that is covered by FTA agreements, the higher the probability of conict between
the two countries (peace diversion). We then expect that 3 > 0.
Sign of 4: As the percentage of trade of the country pair (i, j) with the ROW that is
covered by CU agreements rises, the probability of conict between the two countries could
potentially increase or decrease. Thus, our theory o¤ers no prediction for the sign of 4.
However, a positive sign of 4 will be regarded as evidence of a strong peace-diversion e¤ect
of CU formation.
An obvious econometric issue that emerges when estimating equation (33) is the likely
endogeneity of the FTA and the CU dummies. A negative correlation between these two
variables and the probability of interstate conict could arise with causality running in both
directions. In order to address this endogeneity issue, we estimate equation (33) in three
di¤erent ways. First, we include a large number of potential common determinants of both
regionalism and conict. Second, we take advantage of the panel dimension of our data set
and control for country-pair xed e¤ects. Thereby, we control for time-invariant historical,
cultural, and/or other factors that could be a¤ecting regionalism as well as the probability
of interstate conict, and for which we have no observable variables to account for in our
regressions. Third, to control for unobserved, but time-varying common determinants of
regionalism and conict, we employ an IV strategy.
6.3 Results
Table 2 presents the pooled logit estimations in the rst four columns and the xed-e¤ects
estimations in columns 5 and 6. These estimations are along similar lines as those appearing
in Table 3 in Martin et al. (2008). In all regressions, we control for the number of peaceful
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years since the last MID between the country pair (i, j), which is standard in the political
science literature. Moreover, all regressions, except those in which we control for country-pair
xed e¤ects, include a contiguity dummy and the weighted distance between the two countries
as these are natural determinants of interstate conict as well as of regionalism.
In the rst two regressions, the sample is substantially restricted to only contiguous pairs
(model 1), and contiguous pairs with a bilateral weighted distance of less than 1,000 km
(model 2). These are the country pairs which we expect to be the most prone to engaging in
military conict. In these regressions, in which we do not include any additional controls, the
PTA-related explanatory variables are not statistically signicant.
Regression 3 uses the full sample of country pairs and includes a dummy variable for
zero trade between the country pair, accounting for the existence (or not) of an economic
relationship between the two countries.9 In this regression, we nd evidence of both peace
creation, as indicated by the negative sign of the coe¢ cients on the FTA and the CU dummies,
and peace diversion, as indicated by the positive sign of the coe¢ cient on PTCUijt.
In regression 4, we introduce a broad set of gravity and political controls that are potential
common determinants of both interstate conict and regionalism. Regarding the gravity
controls, we include dummies indicating whether countries i and j share a common language,
whether one of the countries has ever been a colony of the other, and whether the two countries
have had a common colonizer after 1945. These variables have been shown empirically to a¤ect
trade ows between countries (for example, Rose, 2004), and hence, they might also a¤ect
a country pairs incentives to sign a PTA with each other. At the same time, two countries
speaking the same language or having colonial links tend to share cultural, historical, and/or
institutional traits that might a¤ect the probability of them engaging in military conict
against each other. We further control for the number of General Agreement on Tari¤s and
Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) members in the country pair. This variable
is related to the economic ties between the two countries and might, therefore, a¤ect both
the probability of them waging war against each other and the likelihood of them establishing
an FTA or a CU. In addition, regression 4 controls for time e¤ects. More particularly, we
9Following Martin et al. (2008), the zero-trade dummy is lagged by 4 years to address the issue of contem-
poraneous reverse causality.
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include year dummies to control for any global factors that might be a¤ecting the probability
of interstate conict as well as the evolution of regionalism over time. Furthermore, we include
10 dyadic past-war dummies, indicating whether the country pair was at war at date t   1,
t 2,..., t 10, so as to control for temporal autocorrelation of the dependent variable. This set
of dyadic past-war dummies along with the year dummies are included in all the regressions
henceforth.
The political variables included in regression 4 control for the size of the countries in
the pair, their political regime, the diplomatic a¢ nity between them, and the cross-sectional
serial correlation of wars. More specically, we control for the size of the two countries by
including the sum of (the log of) their areas. We include this control because larger countries
might be more susceptible to foreign attack as (i) they might be more di¢ cult to defend; and
(ii) they are more likely to include substantial minorities or to be rich in natural resources.
Larger countries also tend to depend less on international trade, which might have an impact
on their incentives to pursue PTAs. Moreover, we control for political regime by including
the sum of the two countriesdemocracy indexes, where the democracy index ranges from
 10 for a full autocracy to +10 for a full democracy. According to the democratic peace
hypothesis,democracies rarely ght one another (see, for instance, Oneal and Russett, 1997;
Levy and Razin, 2004). At the same time, there is some evidence that democracy promotes
trade cooperation among countries in the form of signing PTAs (Manseld et al., 2002).
We additionally control for diplomatic a¢ nity between the country pair by introducing the
following two variables: (i) a dummy variable for common membership of an international
military alliance; and (ii) the correlation between the two countriesvoting on resolutions in
the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) (lagged by 4 years). Finally, we include
two controls for the cross-sectional serial correlation of wars: (i) the distance to the nearest
ongoing war at time t not involving either country from the pair; and (ii) the total number of
MIDs (excluding their potential bilateral MID) in which the countries of the pair are involved
at date t. Even with the inclusion of this long list of gravity and political controls, regression
4 still provides evidence of peace creation with regard to FTA formation, as well as of peace
diversion in relation to CU establishment.
In columns 56, we add country-pair xed e¤ects and replicate specication 4. Column
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5 shows the results of the xed-e¤ects logit estimation, in which case we lose a substantial
number of observations, since only those pairs of countries that engaged in an MID over the
sample period can be retained. We then perform a standard xed-e¤ects linear probability
estimation. In this case, the whole sample can be used, and the estimation results appear
in column 6. The results of regression 5 are largely supportive of and consistent with our
theoretical predictions, while in regression 6, only the FTA dummy is statistically signicant
(albeit at only the 10% level). At this point, it is important to note that since in our empirical
analysis we pool together data on a very large number of country pairs over a long time period,
the error process is likely to be serially correlated for a given country pair. To deal with this
possibility, the robust standard errors are clustered at the dyad level in all regressions.
Last, we focus on regression 4, which is our preferred one, and carry out numerous robust-
ness checks. We rst control, in line with Martin et al. (2008), for bilateral and multilateral
trade openness using, respectively, the simple arithmetic average of bilateral import ows over
GDP, and the simple arithmetic average of total imports of countries i and j, excluding their
bilateral imports, over their GDP (both lagged by 4 years). Our results still provide evidence
of peace creation in relation to FTA establishment, and peace diversion with respect to CU
formation.
In the rest of our robustness regressions, we primarily control for additional potential
common determinants of regionalism and interstate conict. For example, in one regression,
we add a dummy controlling for the existence of a communist regime in the dyad, as communist
countries have historically been relatively absent from the regionalism scene. We additionally
include a dummy indicating whether one of the two countries is a major power,where the
major powers are dened as the ve permanent members of the UN Security Council (that
is, China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). We obtain qualitatively
similar results to those in column 4. In a di¤erent regression, we add a dummy indicating
whether one of the two countries is an oil-exporting country according to the denition of
the International Monetary Fund in its Direction of Trade Statistics database as possessing
substantial oil resources might a¤ect both a countrys incentives to pursue PTAs and its
propensity of engaging in MIDs (since it might be frequently attacked over these resources).
Following Martin et al. (2008), we also include interaction dummies between the oil-exporter
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dummy and the di¤erent decades within our sample period so as to control for changes in the
price of oil. The results are robust. In another regression, we control for the level of GDP per
capita within the country pair and the di¤erence in per capita GDP between the two countries;
we include as well the square of this di¤erence to capture a potential non-linearity in the
relationship in question. Our results are again robust. Furthermore, controlling, in yet another
regression, for the level of military expenditures within the dyad and the di¤erence in military
spending between the two countries does not a¤ect qualitatively the results. We perform
many additional robustness checks for instance, we experiment with a stricter denition of
war. Overall, our results remain supportive of our theoretical predictions of peace creation
and peace diversion.10 Nevertheless, unobserved, omitted variables could still bias the results.
To deal with this issue, we implement next an IV strategy.
6.4 Instrumental Variables
Since there are two potentially endogenous variables, FTAijt and CUijt, the objective is to
nd two instruments that are strongly correlated with the PTA dummies, but which are not
directly correlated with the probability of interstate conict. To this end, the number of FTA
and CU agreements in force at date t   5 between countries i and j and the ROW are used
separately as IVs for the existence of, respectively, an FTA and a CU agreement between the
country pair (i, j) at date t. Our choice of instruments is driven by the domino theory of
regionalism, which argues that the signing or the deepening of a PTA can induce excluded
nations to apply for membership or if accession to the PTA in question is not feasible, to
pursue PTAs among themselves (Baldwin, 1997). Egger and Larch (2008) as well as Baldwin
and Jaimovich (2012) provide strong empirical support for this theory, which suggests that
the number of FTA (CU) agreements already signed by countries i and j with third countries
could serve as a strong instrument for the existence of an FTA (a CU) agreement between
the two countries at time t. Given also the inclusion of PTFTAijt and PTCUijt in our
regressions, there is no reason to believe that these instruments are directly correlated with
the probability of interstate conict. Our IV strategy clearly echoes Vicard (2012), who
10The variables used in our robustness analysis come from the data set of Martin et al. (2008). Moreover,
the complete robustness results are available from the authors upon request.
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instruments the existence of a deep or a shallow PTA between a country pair at time t with
the number of, respectively, deep or shallow PTAs in e¤ect in t  5 between the two countries
and the ROW.
Using an IV methodology is not straightforward in the case of a binary-choice model
along with binary endogenous variables as here. We therefore use instead a pooled linear
probability model. Table 3 presents the second-stage results of our instrumented regressions.
These regressions are performed on the same sample and use the same control variables as
regression 4 in Table 2. Column 1 reports the results of our benchmark IV regression. The
results provide evidence of both peace creation and peace diversion in relation to FTA as
well as CU establishment. Moreover, all four of the PTA-related explanatory variables are
statistically signicant at either the 1% or the 5% level. In column 2, we experiment with a
di¤erent lag with respect to our IVs. More specically, we use as instruments: (i) the number
of FTA agreements in force at date t 4 between countries i and j and the ROW; and (ii) the
number of CU agreements in e¤ect at time t 4 between the two countries and the ROW. The
results remain very similar to those in column 1, with the exception of the CU dummy that is
now signicant at only the 10% level. In column 3, we compactthe FTA and the CU dummy
variables into one single PTA dummy, which is expected, according to our theoretical model,
to have a negative impact on the probability of an MID between the country pair (i, j).11
The results are again supportive of our theoretical predictions. In fact, in this case, we can
also perform a Sargan (1958) test for overidentication, since we now have two instruments
for only one endogenous explanatory variable. The test statistic is 0.49 and the corresponding
p-value is 0.48, indicating that the joint null hypothesis of instrument exogeneity cannot be
rejected. At the same time, in all three cases, we conrm that our instruments are not weak as
both the Cragg-Donald (1993) and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Wald F statistics well exceed
the critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005).
Finally, we perform numerous robustness checks on our benchmark IV regression. We
initially control for bilateral and multilateral trade openness. We still nd evidence of peace
creation as well as of peace diversion in relation to both FTA and CU formation. Furthermore,
all four of the PTA-related variables continue to be signicant at either the 1% or the 5%
11In regression 3, we use the same instruments as in our benchmark IV regression.
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level. In the same manner as above, we then control among other things for major powers
and communist regimes, for oil-exporting countries, for GDP per capita, and for military
expenditures. In all cases, our results remain supportive of our theoretical predictions of
peace creation and peace diversion. Remarkably, our PTFTAijt variable is signicant at the
1% level (and with the right sign) across our robustness regressions.12
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the implications of FTA and CU agreements for interstate
conict. We have presented a two-stage game with three competing importers, in the rst
stage of which, two of the countries the enemies decide on whether to initiate war against
each other. In the second stage of the game, all three countries select their import tari¤s so
as to maximize national welfare. We have solved this dynamic game under the scenario of
no regionalism and under four di¤erent PTA scenarios, involving an FTA or a CU agreement
either between the two enemies or between one of the enemies and the third country.
Our ndings demonstrate that PTAs produce both a peace-creation and a peace-
diversione¤ect. In particular, a PTA between the enemy countries, in the form of either an
FTA or a CU agreement, decreases, in general, the likelihood that they wage war against each
other. The reason is that such a PTA increases the enemieswelfare under peace (and thereby,
the opportunity cost of war) via the elimination of the ine¢ cient Nash trade barriers between
them and the improvement of their terms of trade vis-à-vis the third country. In other words,
PTAs exert a peace-creation e¤ect on their member countries, which is in line with the vision
of the EUs founding fathers and with the actual experience with the European integration
process.
However, just as with the trade-creation and trade-diversion e¤ects of PTAs, peace creation
goes hand in hand with peace diversion. More specically, in the case of a CU agreement
between one of the adversaries and the third country, the other adversary that is not part of
the CU is more likely to start a war in comparison with the no-regionalism scenario, as the
CU in question lowers, via its terms-of-trade ramications, the countrys welfare under peace
12These robustness regressions are also available from the authors upon request.
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relative to its expected welfare under war. Moreover, in the case of an FTA agreement between
one of the enemy countries and the third country, both enemies are more likely to initiate war
against each other relative to the benchmark scenario of no regionalism. Put di¤erently,
our results establish that CU agreements produce a peace-diversion e¤ect on non-member
countries, whereas FTA agreements exert such an e¤ect on member as well as on non-member
countries. Our empirical analysis validates these predictions, as it provides robust evidence of
both peace creation and peace diversion in relation to FTA as well as CU formation. To our
knowledge, this is the rst paper to identify and explicitly model the peace-diversion e¤ect of
PTAs. In addition, this is the only paper in this literature to endogenize countriesterms of
trade, proposing a novel mechanism through which regionalism can a¤ect interstate conict.
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Variable
Frequency % Frequency %
MID 1,321 0.51 677 0.54
FTA 3,525 1.35 1,867 1.48
CU 4,422 1.70 2,270 2.15
Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
PTFTA 0.087 0.175 0.090 0.170
PTCU 0.089 0.191 0.110 0.210
Observations
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1958–2000)
Notes: Descriptive statistics (frequency, percentage, mean, standard deviation) of
the main variables for the full sample, and for the sample conditioning on the
explanatory variables in column 4 of Table 2.
126,295260,781
Full Sample Restricted
FTA(d) -0.721 -0.875 -2.255 *** -1.738 ** -2.680 ** -0.040 *
CU(d) -0.371 -0.395 -0.462 * -0.017 0.472 -0.024
PTFTA -1.272 -0.376 -0.050 -0.642 -0.030 0.001
PTCU 0.528 -0.635 1.141 *** 0.771 ** 1.640 * -0.007
# peaceful years -0.065 *** -0.057 *** -0.075 *** -0.020 *** 0.020 *** 0.006 ***
ln distance -0.083 0.218 -0.394 *** -0.855 ***
Contiguity(d) 1.124 *** 1.013 ***
Zero trade(t-4)(d) -0.503 *** -0.482 ** 0.096 -0.001
UN vote correlation(t-4) -0.882 *** -0.585 * -0.043 ***
Sum of democracy indexes 0.087 -0.146 0.008
# other wars in t 0.239 *** 0.256 *** 0.064 ***
ln distance to nearest war in t 0.053 -0.091 -0.008 *
Sum ln areas 0.153 ***
Alliance active in t(d) 0.139 0.287 0.002
Common language(d) 0.420 ***
Colonial relationship(d) 0.157
Common colonizer(d) 0.060
# GATT/WTO members in dyad 0.020 ** -0.279 0.002 *
(0.1160) (0.2610) (0.0065)
(0.2600)
(0.2160)
(0.1570) (0.3350) (0.0194)
(0.1610)
(0.0971) (0.1330) (0.0043)
(0.0301)
(0.1330) (0.2540) (0.0074)
(0.0123) (0.0161) (0.0009)
(0.1740) (0.1970) (0.2280) (0.0065)
(0.2130) (0.3340) (0.0125)
(0.2350) (0.0942) (0.1050)
(0.2310) (0.2290)
(1.1840) (0.3280) (0.3010) (0.8610) (0.0212)
(0.0076) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0003)
(0.5940)
(1.4220)
(0.0153)
(0.2390)
(1.1720)
(0.9170)
(0.0121)
(0.1240)
Dependent Variable: MID
Table 2: Impact of PTAs on Military Conflict
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
(0.4400) (0.6780) (0.6880) (1.2380) (0.0213)
(0.2630) (0.2380) (0.2250) (0.3730) (0.0203)
(0.4560) (0.5650) (0.8310) (0.0175)
NPseudo R 2
R 2
Sample
Time dummies
Dyadic war lags   
Estimation 
0.148
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country pair are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and *, respectively, denoting significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels. Time dummies and lagged MIDs (10 years) are not reported. Column 1: contiguous country pairs only. Column 2:
proximate countries only. Column 3: full sample with limited set of controls. Column 4: full sample with full set of controls. Column 5: full
sample with country-pair fixed effects logit model. Column 6: full sample with country-pair fixed effects linear probability model (LPM).
MID = militarized interstate dispute.
Table 2 (continued): Impact of PTAs on Military Conflict
Dependent Variable: MID
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Logit Logit Logit Logit FE Logit FE LPM
No No No Yes Yes Yes
No No No Yes Yes Yes
Contiguous 
pairs
Contiguous 
pairs and 
<1,000km
Full Full Full Full
0.163 0.172 0.325 0.560 0.368
126,2955,747126,295126,2953,6656,504
FTA(d) -0.152 *** -0.146 ***
CU(d) -0.093 ** -0.077 *
RTA(d) -0.110 ***
PTFTA 0.038 *** 0.039 *** 0.035 ***
PTCU 0.026 ** 0.027 ** 0.022 **
# peaceful years 0.000 0.000 0.000
ln distance -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.020 ***
Contiguity(d) 0.283 *** 0.283 *** 0.284 ***
Zero trade(t-4)(d) 0.006 * 0.006 * 0.005
UN vote correlation(t-4) 0.058 *** 0.057 *** 0.056 ***
Sum of democracy indexes 0.006 0.006 0.005
# other wars in t 0.049 *** 0.049 *** 0.049 ***
ln distance to nearest war in t 0.003 0.003 0.002
Sum ln areas -0.005 *** -0.005 *** -0.005 ***
Alliance active in t(d) -0.011 -0.012 -0.009
Common language(d) 0.019 ** 0.020 *** 0.019 **
Colonial relationship(d) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Common colonizer(d) -0.015 -0.015 -0.014
# GATT/WTO members in dyad 0.010 ** 0.009 ** 0.010 **
(0.0039)
(0.0384)
(0.0034)
(0.0114)
(0.0057)
(0.0046)
(0.0029)
(0.0010)
(0.0105)
(0.0077)
(0.0302)
(0.0098)
(0.0303)
(0.0100)
(0.0040)
(0.0312)
(0.0095)
(0.0100)
(0.0001)
(0.0051)
(0.0055)
(0.0046)
(0.0029)
(0.0009)
(0.0110)
(0.0076)
(0.0040)
(0.0404)
(0.0099)
(0.0108)
(0.0001)
(0.0047)
(0.0384)
(0.0034)
(0.0113)
(0.0030)
(0.0010)
(0.0111)
(0.0077)
(0.0304)
(0.0100)
(0.0050)
(0.0383)
(0.0034)
(0.0114)
(0.0057)
(0.0046)
(0.0573) (0.0503)
(0.0454)
(0.0104)
(0.0115)
(0.0001)
Table 3: Instrumental-Variables Regressions: Pooled LPM
Dependent Variable: MID
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
NR 2
Time dummies
Dyadic war lags   
Estimation 
Identification Tests
WID (Kleibergen-Paap Wald F  statistic)
WID (Cragg-Donald Wald F  statistic)
OID (Sargan test)
p -value (OID) 0.4838
IV Pooled 
LPM
IV Pooled 
LPM
IV Pooled 
LPM
Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered by country pair are reported in parentheses with ***, **, and *,
respectively, denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All columns show second-stage IV
estimates. All regressions include time dummies and lagged MIDs (10 years) which are not reported. The
instruments used in model 1 are: (i) the number of FTA agreements in force at time t-5 between the two
countries in the dyad and the ROW; and (ii) the number of CU agreements in effect at time t-5 between
the two countries in the dyad and the ROW. In model 2, we use a four-year lag for the instruments
employed in model 1. In model 3, we use the same instruments as in model 1. WID are weak identification
tests. These tests confirm that the instruments used are not weak since both the Cragg-Donald and the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistics well exceed the critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2005).
The Sargan overidentification test, OID, indicates that the instruments used are valid.
184.9457.3249.11
2,426.35 3,162.77 7,891.73
0.490
Yes
Yes Yes Yes
0.287 0.287 0.287
126,295 126,295 126,295
Table 3 (continued): Instrumental-Variables Regressions: Pooled LPM
Dependent Variable: MID
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
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